Abstract: Quantum cryptography discusses the security of quantum information. Cloud computing has emerged as a computational paradigm and an alternative to the conventional computing. Cloud security is associated with cloud computing. In this paper, we define the new concept about quantum cloud and discuss the security of quantum information exchange in quantum internet. A tripartite simultaneous quantum information exchange protocol associated with the quantum cloud based on entanglement swapping and Bell states is proposed. The proposed secure quantum information exchange protocol can resist intercept-and-resend attack, intercept-and-measure attack, intercept-and-entangle auxiliary attack and denial-of-service attack. It can also be generalised to N-party case that is feasible and efficient.
Introduction
A broad range of fundamental discoveries have been made in the field of quantum information science in the past two decades. In the broad context of quantum information science, quantum networks have an important role, both for the formal analysis and the physical implementation of quantum computing, communication and metrology (Kimble, 2008) .
Cloud computing is a new model of computing in contrast to conventional desktop computing, which providers can build large data centres at low cost due to their expertise in organising and provisioning computational resources. Its architectures have: highly abstracted resources; near instant scalability and flexibility; near instantaneous provisioning; shared resources (hardware, database, memory, etc.); 'service on demand', usually with a 'pay as you go' billing system; programmatic management (Catteddu et al., 2009 ).
Cloud computing is often based on virtualisation and distributed computing technologies. The extensive use of virtualisation in implementing cloud infrastructure brings unique security concerns for customers or a public cloud service of tenants. Virtualisation alters the relationship between the OS and bottom hardware which can computing, storage or even networking. This introduces an additional layer virtualisation that itself must be properly configured, managed and secured. Specific concerns include the potential to compromise the virtualisation software, or 'hypervisor'. While these concerns are largely theoretical, they do exist. For example, a breach in the administrator workstation with the management software of the virtualisation software can cause the whole data centre to go down or be reconfigured to an attacker's liking (Sullivan et al., 2014) .
With the development of the internet, much information is growing to 'big data'. The global quantum internet is believed to be the next-generation information processing platform promising an exponentially speed-up computation and a secure means of communication. The quantum information is growing to big data as well with the development of global quantum internet. Among the applications of global quantum internet, quantum key distribution (abbreviated QKD) (Long et al., 2002; Cabello, 2000; Ekert, 1991; Bennett et al., 1992; Gottesman, 2000) has been identified as the first technology in quantum information science to reach practical applications. Tremendous effort has been dedicated to creating a global QKD network during the past decade. Nonetheless, a real-life QKD network is still limited by two important factors performance and security (Xu et al., 2014) . Other cryptographic tasks can also be realised, such as quantum secreting sharing (abbreviated QSS) with quantum mechanics Hillery et al., 1999; Zhang, 2005) . QSS is the generalisation of classical secret sharing (Karlssn et al., 1999) into quantum scenario and supplies a secure way for sharing not only a classical information (Bandyopadhyay, 2000; but also a quantum information (Beige et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2002) . Compared with QKD, QSS can reduce the resources necessary for the communication of a classical secret information.
A quantum communication protocol has been presented that allows secure direct communication (Deng et al., 2003) , where the message is deterministically sent through the quantum channel and decoded after a final transmission of classical information. It is called quantum secure direct communication (abbreviated QSDC). As an improvement of the one-way QSDC, the concept of bidirectional QSDC (Felbinger et al., 2002; Nguyen, 2007) and some theoretical schemes were proposed, where the users can exchange their secret messages simultaneously in a set of devices. The so-called quantum dialogue, which allow two parties to simultaneously exchange their messages, has been proposed by Nguyen (2004) based on well-known Boströmand-Felbinger protocol (Boström and Felbinger, 2002) . However, Nguyen's scheme is shown to be insecure under intercept-and-resend attack. Man et al. (2005) modified the scheme, such that the intercept-and-resend attack can be detected by introducing and randomly choosing two sets of measuring bases in the control mode. However, there is still a hidden danger under previous schemes, if there were an eavesdropper in the quantum channel when the quantum information qubit is sent, the quantum information would be leaked inevitably to the eavesdropper who adopts the intercept-and-resend auxiliary attacks. Ji and Zhang (2006) present a quantum dialogue scheme based on N batches of single photons, that secret quantum information is encoded on batches of single photons by the sender with two different unitary operations I or iσ y , then N batches of single photons are sent to the receiver. The scheme can resist the intercept-and-resend auxiliary attacks, and also more efficient than schemes in Nguyen (2004) and Man et al. (2005) , because those photons are sent only at one time in this scheme. After that, Jin et al. (Nguyen, 2007) proposed a three-party simultaneously QSDC scheme by using Greenberg-Horne-Zeilinger (abbreviated GHZ) states. In their scheme, Alice can obtain the secret messages of Bob and Charlie. At the same time, Bob (or Charlie) can also obtain secret messages from Alice and Charlie (or Bob). However, in their paper (Nguyen, 2007) , as well as in the most two-way quantum communication schemes, the particles need to travel for two times in quantum channel. Hence, an eavesdropper Eve has twice chances to attack the quantum channel for stealing useful information. Based on Nguyen (2007) , proposed a quantum secret sharing protocol by using Bell states and entanglement swapping (abbreviated ES) . The eavesdropper is detected in correlation between the particles of entanglement Bell-state.
As a frontier research, we think about quantum information communication security associated with quantum cloud in the future. At first, we define a new concept about quantum cloud (see Figure 1) . Definition 1.1: Quantum cloud is a group of quantum computers or other quantum nodes in quantum internet, and each group included hundreds of thousands of units or nodes, or even millions of quantum computers. Quantum cloud computing combined with encryption, which makes customer information more confidential.
Generally, conventional cloud is virtual computing resources which can self-maintenance and management. It is usually a few large server clusters, that including computing servers, storage servers and bandwidth resources and so on. In other words, the conventional cloud is a group of classical computers, that each group included hundreds of thousands of units, or even millions of classical computers. Conventional cloud computing integrates classical computing resource, and realises automatic management through the special software without human involvement. Our quantum cryptography protocol is based on quantum information and the realisation of quantum computer. So we need to use the quantum cloud instead of conventional cloud to complete our protocol. Compared with the conventional cloud, the quantum cloud utilises a group of quantum computers. Quantum computers follow the rules of quantum mechanics to offer the high speed mathematical calculation and logical operations, storage and process physical device of the quantum information. So quantum cloud has stronger power than conventional cloud.
In this paper, a tripartite simultaneous quantum information exchange protocol associated with the quantum cloud by directly transmission of particles based on ES is proposed. It can resist attacks of intercept-and-resend, intercept-and-measure, intercept-and-entangle auxiliary and denial-of-service. It also can be generalised to N participants. In our protocol, we use characteristics of quantum cloud devices, and allow participants use information resources in quantum cloud to seek information operator conveniently. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We present the scheme in Section 2 in detail. And we analyse the security of our scheme in Section 3. We also extend our scheme to N-parties associated with quantum cloud in Section 5. Finally, we make a conclusion.
Quantum information exchange protocol associated with the quantum cloud
If a quantum cloud customer has their own virtual cloud infrastructure, then they will have the ability to implement their own systems to ensure data auditability because they have complete virtualised servers and direct access to install or setup whatever applications they desired in the most cases. Quantum cloud providers or vendors, which are suppliers of cloud services, deliver value to users through various offerings such as software as a service (abbreviated SaaS), platform as a service (abbreviated PaaS) and infrastructure as a service (abbreviate IaaS). SaaS is a software distribution model, in which applications are hosted by a vendor and made available to customers over a network. It is considered to be the most mature type of quantum cloud computing. In PaaS, applications are developed and executed through platforms provided by quantum cloud vendors. This model allows a quick and cost-effective development and deployment of applications. Some facilities provided under PaaS model including database management, security, work flow management, and application serving. In IaaS, compute power and storage space are offered on demand. IaaS can provide server, operating system, disk storage and database, among other things. Data security issues will be most critical for those users above the infrastructure level: users relying on cloud databases, software development platforms, or complete applications. If the quantum internet would have been quickly developed, quantum cloud computing security should be researched too. In quantum cloud, we also use those device of service from SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS to discuss the security of quantum information communication. Quantum cloud platform has some advantages as follows as like classic cloud:
1 the users can access the quantum cloud information at any time in accordance with their own demands 2 many users can share the quantum cloud resources 3 the user can reduce the burden of processing operations. People can hire quantum nodes and other devices for storing resources in quantum internet. In this section, we design a tripartite simultaneous quantum information exchange protocol associated with the quantum cloud. The protocol flow diagram of quantum theory is as Figure 2 . The personal data information of participants can be stored in the quantum cloud service. The participants can also integrate the network of data to transfer the collected regular information to the quantum cloud. The process of tripartite simultaneous quantum information exchange protocol is as follows in detail. If the error rate is below a certain threshold, Alice and Bob can conclude there are no eavesdropper on the quantum channel. They continue to perform next step. Alice makes a record of positions of those photons where are used to check eavesdropping.
4 Alice creates a sequence of particles prepared by one of non-orthogonal states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−v} randomly. Alice inserts them into the sequence S C and performs the same unitary operation on S C as S B . Then Alice sends the sequence S C to Charlie. Only Alice knows positions of those non-orthogonal particles. Alice upload these information to her private quantum cloud.
5 Alice can obtain secret information of participants by their authorisation and check secret information is legal or not. After receiving the sequence S C , Alice and Charlie check eavesdropping by procedure: a Alice tells Charlie which particles are non-orthogonal and MB he has chosen for each photons b Simultaneously, Alice tells Charlie her chosen particles and MB in S C since they are same as S B for checking eavesdropper existing c Charlie tells Alice his measurement results in quantum cloud.
Alice analyses the error rate based on these results. If the error rate is higher than threshold, the process is aborted. Conversely, the process continues. Charlie stores a number of these non-orthogonal particles. By comparing the measurement results, Alice analyses the error rate. If the error rate is below the certain threshold, the protocol continues.
8 Charlie chooses the same position particles as like as Bob's and performs one of four unitary operations {I, iσ y , σ z , σ x } on each of his particles, and chooses the same position particles as like as Bob's to perform the transformation H. Charlie inserts a number of non-orthogonal particles randomly in the sequence S C as in step 5 and sends the sequence S C to Alice. Only Charlie knows the positions of these non-orthogonal particles. Charlie uploads these information to his private quantum cloud.
9 Alice downloads Charlie's information from Charlie's private quantum cloud. After receiving the sequence S C , Alice and Charlie check eavesdropping: a Charlie tells Alice which particles are non-orthogonal states and which MB he has chosen in the quantum cloud b Charlie tells Alice which particles performed by the transformation H in the quantum cloud c Alice chooses same MB to measure these non-orthogonal particles and same transformation H to perform on photon sequence as like as Charlie's d Alice performs BM on his particles.
Alice analyses the error rate, if the error rate is below the certain threshold, the protocol continues.
10 If they are certain that there is no eavesdropping, Alice performs BM on the rest of particles 13 and 24. Then Alice publishes the initial of these particles and his measurement results in the quantum cloud. Bob and Charlie can obtain the original secret information and realise the information exchange in the quantum cloud.
Our protocol is feasible and easily realised by experiment since Bell-state and entanglement swapping is available. From the initial state, the measurement results and operation of every participant, Alice, Bob and Charlie are able to unambiguously exchange the secret information in accordance with detailed Table 1 . 
Security analysis
The importance of regulative institutions such as laws, contracts and courts in the quantum cloud industry should be obvious if this industry is viewed against the backdrop of the current state of security standards. The state uses coercive power in order to gain compliance. In the absence of radical improvements in security technology, such institutions become even more important because quantum cloud users can rely on these institutions in case a quantum cloud provider's failure to deliver a given level of security.
Here we propose a protocol associated with the quantum cloud that exchange the information between participants and protect the participants' privacy by the quantum cloud. Our proposed scheme that can achieve to access the quantum cloud information at any time, and participants can share themselves information and the collected data of sensor in the quantum cloud by other participants' authorisation. It takes advantages of characteristics of the quantum cloud and quantum computation. In this section, we analyse how our scheme can defend against various attacks. In this section, we discuss how to achieve security in our scheme by the characteristics of quantum communication protocol. We also use encryption to keep the security of information in the quantum cloud. Therefore, the participant cannot get any information of another participant if he (or she) has not been authorised. Suppose an eavesdropper Eve wants to steal secret information. We show that the scheme is secure against some attacks from eavesdropper. Any type of Eve's attacks destroy the correlations of entangled particles and can be easily detected. The attack strategy can be described in detail as follows.
The intercept-and-resend attack
1 When Alice sends the particle 3 (or 4) to Bob (or Charlie), Eve captures and stores all of them. Eve creates a number of entanglement states 1 2 | ( |0 0 |1 1) .
ab ab + Φ 〉 = 〉 + 〉 Eve can not download participants' information from the quangum cloud since she has not been authorised. Eve sends the faked particle b to Bob. But, Eve would not obtain the secret information between Bob and Alice. Eve can be detected since here is no any correlation between the particle A of Alice and the faked particle b, when Alice and Bob implement the eavesdropping detection step. The analysis is as like as Alice and Charlie when there is a eavesdropper Eve.
2 When Bob (or Charlie) sends the particle 3 (or 4) back to Alice, Eve captures and stores all of them. However, Bob chooses a number of particles from the sequence S B randomly and performs transformation H on them. Eve does not know which particle is chosen by Bob. Eve has not been authorised to download the participants' information from the quantum cloud too. Eve sends the faked particles to Alice. when Alice and Bob (or Charlie) implement the eavesdropping detection step, this attack can be detected.
The intercept-and-measure attack
However, Alice performs the transformation H on the particle 1 as following formula if there is no eavesdropping.
( 1 4 ) So the error rate for eavesdropping will be as high as 75%. When the number of particles that are used to check eavesdropping is enough large, this attack can be easily detected. When Bob sends the particle 3 to Alice, Eve captures them. Bob and Alice utilise the decoy particles to perform the eavesdropping check. Therefore, Eve measures or sends the faked particles can be detected easily.
The denial-of-service attack
If Eve attempts to make a quantum machine or quantum network resource in the protocol unavailable to its intended users by a denial-of-service (abbreviated DoS) attack. Eve implements to measure the particles or use the one of four unitary operation randomly on the Bell states as her DoS attack. The entanglement state would be destroyed by Eve's measurement and found by legitimate users under the first way of attack. Under the second way of attack, the phase of the EPR-pair would be changed randomly. Eve can be detected by certified users easily. So the protocol can also resist DoS attack.
As discussed above, we can ensure the security of this protocol. The eavesdropper Eve will be found out and can not read out the secret information. In order to ensure the legitimate users' privacy, we use the quantum cloud device to store the private information in our scheme. The administrator of quantum cloud can not get the personal data. The quantum information exchange protocol is based on EPR-pair, so the proof of security is similar to Nguyen (2004) and Man et al. (2005) . Quantum cloud security is faced with three serious problems: Network theft, attack the quantum cloud itself and quantum cloud service vendor data were leaked. So we take full advantage of quantum cryptography to make safety of customer's information. Combine quantum cloud security with quantum cryptography, the security is promoted.
N-party case of the protocol
The quantum information exchange protocol associated with the quantum cloud is easily to be generalised to N-party case ( Figure 5 Then she uploads BM results and the initial state into her private quantum cloud. Bobs downloads these secret information form the quantum cloud. According to the measurement results and the initial state, Bobs read out Alice's secret message directly. Alice reads out each Bobs' secret message directly. And Bob i also reads out the secret message of each Bob j (i ≠ j) directly. So the multipartite quantum information exchange protocol is entirely successfully. The security analysis of the N-party simultaneous quantum information exchange is similar to the tripartite case. Any eavesdropping can leads to the discrepancy between the state of Alice sent and the state of certified user reconstructed. Thus Eve can be detected by comparing a subset of the quantum states publicly.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a multi-party quantum information exchange protocol associated with the quantum cloud. Comparing with some quantum cryptography protocols of using multi-particle GHZ state, the advantages of our protocol are the users can exchange information with Bell states. It is more convenient in a practical application than others. Whether the agents have quantum memory or not, our protocol has the advantage of having a high intrinsic efficiency for exchanging information. For a two-way quantum information exchange, it is useful for the certified users by entanglement and eavesdropping check. The eavesdropper is detected by the correlation of the entanglement state easily. It can resist attacks of intercept-and-resend, intercept-and-measure, intercept-and-entangle auxiliary and denial-of-service. In our protocol, we use characteristics of quantum cloud devices, and allow participants use information resources in the quantum cloud to seek information operator conveniently. It can also be generalised to N participants.
